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Huib van de Stadt, Arie Kapteyn, and Sara van de Geer* 
Ahstrucr-The  paper  addresses  the  question  whether  utility 
may be viewed as a completely relative concept. In a dynamic 
setting this means that one has to model both habit formation 
and utility interdependence. The resulting model contains un- 
observable variables  and requires panel data to be estimated. 
Using the first  two waves  of  an annual panel  in The Nether- 
lands, different  specifications of  the  model  are estimated, in- 
volving alternative sets of  identifying restrictions. It turns out 
that the data are compatible with the hypothesis that utility is 
completely relative, but we cannot exclude the possibility that 
utility is partly relative and partly absolute. 
I.  Introduction 
M
OST economic models of  human behavior 
assume that individual utility functions are 
onstant, i.e.,  not influenced  by  the  behavior  of 
others  or  by  own  past  behavior.  This  does  not 
imply that economists building these models nec- 
essarily  believe in  the invariance of  utility  func- 
tions.  In  fact, papers explicitly defending  the in- 
variance  of  utility  are rather  scarce,  Stigler  and 
Becker (1977) being a notable exception. For most 
others,  constant  utility  functions  may  serve  pri- 
marily  as  a  first  approximation or  a  convenient 
starting point. Whatever the exact motivation may 
be,  endogenous  preferences  have  not  gained  a 
strong foothold  in economics, despite a long his- 
tory of  economists acknowledging that preferences 
are not constant and can be influenced by a variety 
of  variables.'  In  contrast,  major  parts  of  psy-
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chology  and  sociology  assume  the  variability  of 
preferences (and opinions, values, norms, etc.) and 
construct models to explain  the variation.  These 
theories come under headings such as relative de- 
privation  theory  (e.g.,  Davis  (1959),  Runciman 
(1966)), adaptation level theory (e.g., Helson (1964, 
1971)), reference group theory (Hyman and Singer 
(1968)), etc. 
There is a small group of  economists who main- 
tain  that  utility  is  a completely relative  concept, 
that is, an individual evaluates a bundle of  con-
sumption goods by comparing it to the consump- 
tion bundles of  others, or perhaps  to the bundles 
the individual has consumed in the past. Duesen- 
berry's relative income hypothesis is probably the 
best  known  example of  a  theory  that  rests on a 
relative  utility  concept (Duesenberry  (1949)). Be- 
fore Duesenberry,  the Dutch economist Van  der 
Wijk (1939) already hypothesized: "Withn a very 
wide range of  incomes, every group in society feels 
equally  poor"  (p. 57).  In  turn,  he  quotes  Marx 
(1930) as one of the proponents of similar ideas. In 
more  recent  times,  Easterlin (1974) has provided 
evidence that the level of  income contributes little 
to one's  subjective feeling of  well-being, whereas 
one's  ranking  in  the  income  distribution  of  a 
country has a significant effect. At about the same 
time, Duncan (1975), a sociologist, came to similar 
conclusions. 
One of  us (Kapteyn (1977)) has formalized  the 
notion of  relative  utility  into a  theory of  prefer- 
ence formation. Empirical studies have turned up 
evidence  in  favor  of  the  theory  (e.g.,  Van 
Herwaarden et al. (1977), Kapteyn (1977), Kapteyn 
et al. (1980), Kapteyn and Wansbeek (1982)). The 
theory  is  essentially  dynamic,  but  hitherto  only 
cross-sectional data have been  available to test it. 
In this paper, longitudinal (panel) data are used to 
investigate the empirical validity of  the theory. 
The utility concept used in the empirical analy- 
sis is the individual welfare function of  income due 
to Van Praag (1968, 1971). It is briefly described in 180  THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 
section  11.  The relativity  theory,  which  explains 
differences in  utility  functions  between  different 
individuals, is  presented next  (section  111).  Since 
the  ideas investigated here  have  been  motivated 
and explained at various places (see the references 
above), the theory is not presented in its greatest 
generality, but in a form that corresponds to the 
data at hand. In section IV the estimating equa- 
tion is derived. The empirical results are presented 
and discussed in section V. 
11.  The Utility Concept 
Consider an indirect utility function defined on 
prices  and  in~ome.~  Within  a  community where 
individuals can be assumed to face the same prices, 
the  indirect  utility  function  can  be  taken  to be 
exclusively a function of  income. Suppose we  are 
able  to  observe  this  indirect  utility  function  for 
each individual in the community. Partly due to 
the  lack  of  price  variation  across  individuals, it 
will generally be impossible to retrieve the corre- 
sponding direct utility functions solely on the basis 
of  this information. However, for tests of  a relative 
theory  of  utility  we  do not  need  to  know  the 
complete direct utility function per individual. Im- 
plications  of  the  theory  for  differences in  direct 
utility functions between individuals carry over to 
implications regarding indirect utility functions. If 
we  are thus able to measure indirect utility func- 
tions per individual, we  may expect to be able to 
perform  at  least  some  tests  of  a  relative  utility 
theory. 
In this study we  use individually measured util- 
ity functions of  income, whose theoretical basis is 
similar, though not identical, to that of  an indirect 
utility function. The concept used is the individual 
welfare function  of  income  (WFI), introduced  by 
Van Praag (1968, 1971). Van Praag assumes that 
individuals  are  able  to  rate  income  levels  on  a 
bounded ratio scale. More specifically, his theory 
implies  that  an  individual  n  will  evaluate  any 
income y  according to hls WFI Un(y), which has 
approximately the following functional form: 
Un(Y)  = A(  Y; Pn,  on)  N(ln Y; Pn, on),  (1) 
where  A(. ;  p,, on) is  the  lognormal  distribution 
function  with  median  exp(p,)  and  log-variance 
and  N(. ;  pn,  an) is  the  normal  distribution 
function  with  mean  pn  and  variance  The 
2 "  Income"  always means "after-tax family income." 
lognormal distribution  function  serves here  as  a 
purely mathematical description of  Un(y). It does 
not  entail any probabilistic connotation. Yet, its 
isomorphism with a probability distribution func- 
tion will be exploited extensively in the sequel. For 
lack  of  space we  refer  to Van  Hemaarden and 
Kapteyn (1981)  and Buyze (1982) for  details  of 
measurement and tests of  Van Praag's hypothesis. 
111.  Relative Utility 
In line with  the various  theories  mentioned in 
the introduction, Kapteyn (1977) has formulated a 
theory  which  assumes  that  utility  is  completely 
relative. For expositions of  his so-called theory of 
preference  formation we  refer  to Kapteyn (1977, 
1980) or  Kapteyn  et  al.  (1980).  Here  we  shall 
present  only  a  simplified  version  which  can  be 
tested against the data at hand. 
The basic idea is  that  an individual's  WFI is 
nothing else than a perceived income distribution, 
That is, an individual evaluates any income level 
by its ranking in the income distribution that he 
perceives. To operationalize this idea, we  have to 
explain  what  is  meant  by  a  perceived  income 
distribution. To that end some notation is intro- 
duced. 
Let  there be  N  individuals in society. Time is 
measured  in years,  t = - oo,. .  . ,0, where  t = 0 
represents the present. At each moment of  time an 
individual  n  (n -; 1, .  . . ,  N) is assumed  to assign 
non-negative reference weights wnk(t)  to any indi- 
vidual  k  in society (k = 1, . . . ,  N), X,N=,wnk(t)  = 
1. The reference weights indicate the importance 
individual n attaches to the income of  individual k 
at time t. Obviously, quite a few of  the wnk(t)  will 
be zero. On the other hand, wnn(t),  i.e., the weight 
that  individual  n  attaches  to  his  own  income 
at  time  t,  may  be  substantial.  The  vector 
twnl(t),. . .  ,wn,n-l(t), wn,,,+l(t),  . .  .  >wnNtt))  will 
sometimes  be  referred  to as  n's  social reference 
group at time t.3 
Furthermore, let yk(t)  be the income of  individ- 
ual k  at time t. The reference weights now allow 
for the definition of  a perceived income distribution 
at time t. Denote this function by ~,(ylt),  then its 
The term "reference  group"  is due to Hyman (1942). The 
term can have different meanings. Here we use it in the sense of 
a  compurutiue  reference group, i.e., the reference group serves 
as "a standard or comparison point against which  the individ- 
ual can evaluate himself  and others"  (Kelley, 1947). 181  THE RELATIVITY OF UTILITY 
definition is 
The F,(ylt)  for any  t  can be  aggregated to one 
presently perceived income distribution,  F,(y).  To 
that end a non-negative memory function a,(t)  is 
introduced, which describes individual n 's weight- 
ing of  perceived incomes over time, 
The  presently  perceived  distribution  function 
F,(y)  can now be defined as 
0 
F,,(Y) =  C  a,(t)F,(ylt).  (4) 
r= -cc 
As indicated above, the preference formation the- 
ory claims that ths perceived income distribution 
equals the utility function U,(y)  of  the individual. 
It is this claim that we want to shed some light on 
in this paper. 
The development  of  the  argument  so  far  has 
been in terms of  individual incomes, whereas our 
data refer to family income (cf. the mrding of  the 
survey question above). Hence, we reformulate the 
preference  formation  theory in terms of  incomes 
per  equivalent adult.  Let  fk(t) be the number of 
equivalent adults in family k at time t. The income 
per  equivalent  adult  in  this  family  at  time  t  is 
denoted by 
~k(~)  (5) ~k(')/fk(~). 
The reformulation of  U,,(y) in terms of  incomes 
per equivalent adult amounts to a transformation 
of  the income scale: y is replaced by j -y/f,  and 
epnl  by e'",1/f11.4  Consequently, 
U,,(Y)= N(lny; P,,,~,,) 
= N(ln j;  ,in,  = 0,(j). a,) 
Replacing yk(t)  and y in (2) and (4) by uk(t)  and 
j, we obtain the perceived distribution of  incomes 
per equivalent adult F,(j). 
The theory of  preference formation now states 
To investigate the empirical validity of  the the- 
ory, we derive from (7) implications for variations 
in  p  and  a  over individuals, whch can be  con- 
fronted  with  the  data at  hand.  Denote  the  first 
log-moment of  Fn(j)  by m,: 
tk, = Lmln  ud~,(j) 
0  N 
=  C  a,(t) C w"k(t>lnuk(t>.  (8) 
t=m  k=l 
The equality of  the two distribution functions 0, 
and F,  implies the equality of  the first two log-mo- 
ments: 
p, = In f, + tk,  + c, 
0  N 
= lnf, +  C  a,(t> C wnk(t> 
r=-m  k=l 
x In Jk(t) + en,  (9) 
0  N 
0,'  =  C  a,(t> C ~,k(t) 
I= cc  k =1 
where measurement errors in p,  and a,'  and errors 
in the equations are taken into account by means 
of  the identically  and  independently  distributed 
(i.i.d.)  disturbance  terms  c,  and  S,,  with  zero 
means and variances a:  and a:. 
To facilitate estimation  of  (9) and (lo), a  few 
more assumptions and definitions are needed. We 
assume that  w,,,(t)  is the same for all individuals 
and constant  over  time, i.e.,  all  individuals  give 
themselves  the  same  constant  weight.  We  write 
P2 - w,,(t)  and  p,  = Ck+  ,wnk(t)  = 1 - p,.  The 
function  In fk(t) is  specified  as Po + Pl In fsk(t) 
where fsk(t)  is the number of  members of  family k 
at time t. The memory function  a,(t) is assumed 
to be  the  same  for  everyone and is  specified  as 
a,,(t) = (1 - a)a-'. Furthermore, we define 
=O,  k=n  (11) 
mn(t> = Cqnk(t)ln~k(t),  (12) 
k 
h,(t) = Cq,k(t)lnfk(t) 
G,(j)=F,(j);  n=1,  ...,N;  ~E(o,cQ).  k 
(7)  = Po  + 81{~q,k(r)1nfsk(t)) 
K 
For convenience, we generally omit arguments equal to zero, 
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where hs,(t)  is defined implicitly. So,  Z,(t)  and 
Gn(t)  are the log-means of  incomes  and family 
sizes in family n 's social reference group at time t. 
All this makes it possible to rewrite (9) as 
Using  the  expression  for  In fn  and  applying  a 
Koyck transformation, (14) can be written as 
We observe that (15) has no constant term (the 
terms in fi,  cancel out).  If  we  allow for  the fact 
that incomes in previous years have to be deflated 
by  a price index it is easy to show that this does 
not influence the coefficients in (15), but only gives 
rise  to a  constant  term.  In  the  empirical  appli- 
cation  (15)  has  been  estimated  with  a  constant 
term included. 
It is rather  straightforward to use (10) and de- 
rive an expression for a:  similar to (15). However, 
that  expression  is non-linear  in both  parameters 
and variables. It will be seen in the next  section 
that  estimation  of  (15),  which  is  non-linear  in 
parameters but linear in variables, is already com- 
plicated.  Estimation  of  a  similar  relation for  a: 
would involve problems of  measurement errors in 
a non-linear model. Since we  have not yet solved 
the estimation  problems  posed  by  such  a model 
satisfactorily, only (15) will be confronted with the 
data. 
IV.  Estimation of  the pn-equation 
The data  consist  of  the  first  two  waves  of  a 
panel of  775 households in The Netherlands. The 
panel  survey  is  conducted  by  the  Netherlands 
Central  Bureau  of  Statistics.  The  main  bread-
winner  of  each  hoasehold  was  interviewed  in 
March 1980 and in March 1981. The items in the 
questionnaire included  questions  to  measure  the 
respondent's  WFI,  the  after-tax  family  income, 
family composition, and a number of  demographic 
and socio-economic characteristics. On the basis of 
this information (15) is estimated. 
The main problem with the estimation of  (15) is 
that  Z,  and hs,  are unobservable. To solve this 
problem  we  model  the reference weights  wnk as 
realizations of  a stochastic process. Two assump- 
tions are made about this stochastic process. 
The first assumption is that society can be parti- 
tioned in social groups GI,.  .  . ,G,, . . . ,GI, such that 
there exist constants P, satisfying 
P,/(N, - 1) + an,  if  n E G,, 
k E G, 
qnk = I
(1 - P ) - + 8  if n E G., 
k %zG,, 
(16) 
where N,  is the number of individuals in group i 
and where  Snk  is an error term  with zero mean, 
distributed  independently  of  all  P,,  all  incomes 
and all family sizes in society. Note that 
E C qnk=P,  ifnEG,, i=l,  ...,I. 
k € G, 
(17) 
Thus,  P,  is  the  total  reference  weight  that  an 
individual n in G, assigns, on average, to the other 
individuals  k E G,.  Assumption  (16)  therefore 
states that, on average, individuals within a group 
G,  give  a  total weight  P,  to others in the  same 
group  and  a  total weight  (1 - PI) to individuals 
outside their own group. 
The second assumption is that the P,  themselves 
are (realizations  of) random  variables  which  are 
generated according to 
where  A, is  an i.i.d. random variable  with mean 
zero and variance  02.Since (1 - P,) is  the total 
weight  given  to individuals  outside group  i  and 
N - N,  is the number of  individuals outside group 
i, the interpretation of  q  is  that  it is  the mean 
reference weight assigned by individuals to others 
outside their own group. 
The first assumption makes it possible to rewrite 
Enas follows: 
-
mn  = Cqnklnyk 
k 
= P,y,*  +(1 - ~,)j:  + CSnkln  yk, 
k 
for n E G,,  (19) 
where y,*  is the mean log-income of  individuals in 
group i, other than n;  j,*  is the mean log-income 183  THE RELATIVITY OF UTILITY 
of  individuals  outside  G,.  Let  Y  be  the  mean  (5  = 1, so (1 - P,)/(N - N,) = 1/N.  Hence Pi = 
log-income in society, then  N,/N,  i.e.,  weights are assigned  to  social groups 
- 1  roughly in proportion to their share of  the popula- 
Y=y,*(N, - l)/N+J,*(N- Nj)/N+  -1nyn  tion). N 
for n E G~. (20)  In the present  application we  have partitioned 
the sample in groups of*respondents  who have the 
Next define  = (N - ')(5.  It is straightfornard to  same education level, the same employment status 
show that (18)-(20)  imply  and who  are of about  the same age.6 For  these 
E, = (1 - K)Y,* + K.  F+g(F-Inyn)  groups we have calculated the sample counterparts 
+A,[N.  Y -(N - l)y,* - ln yn]  of y,*  and  fn* for each individual (i.e., within a 
group  the  mean  log-income and  log-family  size 
f Dn,ln  Yk.  (21)  varies slightly per respondent because the respon- 
k  dent's own income and family size are not part of 
According to (18)  (5  is of  the order of  magnitude  the  definition of  y,*  and  f,*).7  ~h~ definition of 
of  - Ni),  so  that  g(Y  -ln  Yn)  can  be  ne- the social groups is partly dictated by the available 
glected  without  losing much precision, provided  data, but there is also some evidence in the litera- 
that groups are defined in such a way that N -8 ture that age, employment and education are im- 
is large.5  portant determinants of  reference groups.* 
Defining  Inserting (22) and (23) into (15) yields the fol- 
U,  = D,,ln  Y,  lowing estimating equation: 
k 
P,t  = El  - - a)lPJnfs,
+A,[N.  Y-(N- l)y,* -lnyn], 
-aP11nfsn(-1)  + ,320 - a)lnyn 
(21) can then be written as 	 +&(I - 41  - K)Y,* 
- rn,=(~-~)y,*+tc.Y+u,.  (22)  -P3(1 - a)(l - ~)Plf,* 
We can derive a similar expression for G,:  +apn(-l) +YO + ln 

E,=(I-K)~,*+K-F+V,,  (23)  = (1 - y,)P1lnfsn - aP,lnfs,( -1) 

+y,ln  Yn + Y,Y,*- ~,Plf,*
where f,*  is the mean log-family size of  families in  +ap.(-l)  +YO+ l,  (24) the group individual  n  belongs  to,  excluding his 
own  family,  and  F  is  mean  log-family  size  in 
society; a term q(F-1n  fs,)  has been neglected.  'Five  education levels are distinguished, three employment 
The  assumptions (16)  and  (18)  have  thus  al-  situations  (self-employed,  employee, not  employed)  and  five 
age brackets (less than 30, 30-39,  40-49,  50-65,  over 65). This 
lowed  for  very  simple operationalizations of  m,  leads to 51 social groups in the sample, 
and 5,  by  means of  (22) and (23). Both En  and  'Moreover, In Y,  and is,  are explanato~  variables in (151, so 
also including them in the computation of  the sample counter-  6,  are written as convex  of a social  parts of  y,*  and f,*  would introduce unnecessary multicollin- 
group mean (y,*  and  f,*)  and a society mean (Y  earity. 
and F).Whether the operationalization is success-  'It  follows  from  Festinger's  theory  of  social  comparison 
ful in practice depends on K.  If we are able to find  processes (Festinger, 1954)  that people  primarily 
to others  who  are  similar, and a large  amount  of  empirical 
a partitioning into Social groups G, such that  K  is  evidence supports this contention to varying degrees. Borrow- 
close to zero, then reference groups hardly cross  ing  from attribution theory, Goethals  and Darle~  (1977) are 
able to be more specific about how "similar others" have to be  the  boundaries  of  the  groups  (if  = O7  defined. If  an individual wants to evaluate a particular ability, 
N . (5 = 0 So  Pi = 1, cf. (18)). In that case, social  he will seek comparison with others who are comparable with 
groups are informative about reference groups. If,  respect  to  attributes related  to  that  ability.  For  example,  a 
runner will compare her or his performance to the performance  on  the other hand,  for a partitioning  into social  of  others who are of  the same sex, who are of  approximately 
groups we  find that  K = 1, the social groups give  the same age, practice a similar number of  hours per week and 
no information on reference groups (if K  = 1, N .  run in similar circumstances. Translating this to the evaluation 
of  income, people  will  compare  themselves  to others whose 
income generating attributes are similar: employment situation, 
Given that  N  is the number of  families in society, N - N,  education and age are then hlghly relevant attributes (witness 
will be large as long as the different groups are of  comparable  the fact  that education and age are almost invariably used by 
size.  economists as predictors in wage equations). 184  THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 
where 

yo = P3(1 - u)K(~ 

l,, = €,l  - act1(-1) 
+p3(l - a)u, - P3(1 - a)Plu,.  (25) 
The reparameterization in the last member of  (24) 
is given to facilitate the presentation of  the results 
in the next section. 
Given the stochastic assumptions introduced so 
far,  the  error  term  l,  is  uncorrelated  with  all 
explanatory variables on  the  right  hand  side  of 
(24),  except  p ,(  -1).  The  covariance  between 
p,,(-  1) and l,  is  unrestricted  and  will  be  esti- 
mated. 
As  a  second  observation  on  the  stochastic 
specification  of  (24), note that  replacing  y,*  and 
f,,*  in (24) by  their  sample counterparts  induces 
measurement  error. Since y,*  and f,*  are simply 
estimated  as  sample means,  the variance-covari- 
ance  matrix  of  their  measurement  errors can be 
obtained  in  the usual  way.  In principle,  this  co- 
variance  matrix  is  different  for  different  social 
groups. For simplicity, we have averaged all these 
matrices and used the result as our estimate of  the 
error  variance-covariance  matrix  for  all  observa- 
tions. 
Assuming that the random variables involved all 
follow  approximately  a normal  distribution, (24) 
can  be  estimated  by  means  of  maximum  likeli- 
hood. To that end, the LISREL computer program 
(version IV) has been used.9 
V.  Results and Discussion 
We have  estimated thlrteen different specifica- 
tions  of  (24)  to bring  out  the  sensitivity of  the 
results  to  the  assumptions  made.  Thls  follows 
suggestions by Leamer (1983). 
As  a  bench-mark  we  present  ordinary  least 
squares (OLS) results of  a regression of  p,  on the 
right hand side variables in (24): 
number of  observations: 775.  R~ = 0.808. 
The LISREL-specification and the variance-covariance ma- 
trix of  the data are available from the authors on request. Write 
to Arie Kapteyn, Department of  Econometrics, Tilburg Univer- 
sity, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands. 
All coefficients have the predicted sign. Both habit 
formation and preference interdependence (repre- 
sented by the coefficients of  In y,,  y,*  and p,( -1)) 
contribute significantly to  the explanation of  p,. 
The coefficient of  determination is quite satisfac- 
tory, although the main contribution comes from 
the lagged dependent variable p,(-  1). 
The  remaining  twelve  specifications  can  be 
grouped in two sets. In the first set we  treat  the 
measurement  errors  in  y,*  and  f,*  in  the  way 
indicated in the previous section. In the second set 
of  specifications measurement errors in y,*  and f,* 
are  assumed  to  be  absent.  For  the  rest,  the  six 
specifications in both  sets are pairwise identical. 
Table 1presents the results. 
Columns A1 and B1  contain  the results based 
on the statistical  assumptions  spelled out in  the 
previous  section.  The  differences  between  both 
columns are generally small. The X2-values  indi- 
cate  a  satisfactory  fit.''  The parameter  estimate 
most affected by  the assumption on the errors in 
y,*  and f,*  is that of  K.  Given the high standard 
errors we  can neither  exclude the possibility that 
K  = 0 nor  that  K = 1. The latter  possibility  sug- 
gests that our definition of  social groups may have 
been a poor one (cf. the previous section). 
This is  further illustrated  by  columns  A2  and 
B2,  where  estimation  results  are given  after  im- 
posing  y,  = 0,  i.e., no effect of  y,*  on p,  is  al- 
lowed. Since y,  = P,(l - a)(l - K),  cf. (24), y,  = 
0  can  be  the  result  of  either  p,  = 0  or  K  = 1 
(according to the first row,  a # 1). The values of 
p,  and K  in columns A2 and B2 (and A3 and B3) 
have been computed by assuming K = 1and using 
p,  + P3 = 1. The restriction P2 + P,  = 1is neces- 
sary  for  the  identification  of  P3. Dropping  the 
restriction,  we  could  equally well  assume P,  = 0 
and leave  K  unrestricted. Empirically, both sets of 
assumptions are equivalent. The restriction  P2 + 
p,  = 1 can  only  be  tested  if  we  are  willing  to 
impose further restrictions (see below). 
The restriction y,  = 0 does not worsen the fit of 
the model significantly,"  as could already be ex- 
lo Each  specification considered  imposes restrictions  on  the 
variance-covariance  matrix  of  the  observable  variables.  The 
X2-value for  a  gven  specification is  minus  two  times  the 
log-likelihood ratio which  tests this specification (the null hy- 
pothesis) against the alternative hypothesis  that  the variance- 
covariance matrix of  the observables is unrestricted. 
The  difference  in  X2-values between  columns  1 and  2 
provides the likelihood ratio test  statistic (with one degree of 
freedom) to  test  the  null  hypothesis  that  y,  = 0  against  the 
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pected  on the basis of  columns A1 and B1.  Thus 
we  cannot  reject  the possibility  that  y,*  has  no 
influence on p,.  Under the assumption that P2 + 
p,  = 1, columns A1  and  B1  would  suggest  that 
this  is  primarily  due  to  a  poor  choice of  social 
groups, because P,  differs significantly from zero 
but  K  is not significantly different from one. 
In columns A3 and B3 the further restriction is 
imposed  that [, = en - a€,(-  l), i.e.,  in (25)  u, 
and u,  are zero. Also this restriction is not rejected 
by the data. Notice that as a result it is possible to 
estimate  a:.  Referring  to  model  (14),  1 -
u:/var(p,)  is  the  proportion  of  variance  in  p, 
explained by the theoretical model. We find  that 
1 - 0.017/0.125  = 0.864. 
In columns A4 and B4  the additional restriction 
y,  = 0 is imposed. So model (14) can be written as 
where  [,(7)  is  an  individual  specific effect.  So 
p,(~)  is  only influenced by  family size and ran- 
dom shocks. For the rest  p,(~)  evolves over time 
autonomously as described by (27). 
If  a = 1, this model reduces to 
i.e.,  there  is  no  habit  formation  or  preference 
interdependence.  Apart  from  a  correction  for 
family  size,  the  observed  value  p,(~)  then 
fluctuates randomly around the true and constant 
5,.  The possibility  that  a = 1 cannot be rejected 
within  this  specification,  but  the  "absolute" 
specification  itself  is  decisively  rejected  by  the 
data. 
Columns  A5  and  B5  are just  reparameteriza- 
tions  of  columns  A1  and  B1.  In  A1  and  B1, 
p2 + P3 = 1 is a maintained hypothesis. This hy- 
pothesis is testable only if  we  are willing to make 
additional  assumptions;  K  = 0  (no  reference 
weights  assigned  to  people  outside  one's  social 
group) is  one such assumption. Notice  that,  for 
K  = 0, P2 + P3 = 1is equivalent to y,  + y3 + a = 
1. We find  that  y,  + y,  + a = .976(.045) in col- 
umn A1 and y,  + y,  + a = .972(.046) in B1. These 
numbers do not differ significantly from one. This 
is  confirmed  by  columns A6  and  B6  where  the 
restrictions  K  = 0  and  p2+ P3 = 1 are imposed 
simultaneously.  The  fit  does  not  worsen  signifi-
cantly, so given  K  = 0 we cannot reject P2 + P,  = 
1, i.e., that utility is completely relative. 
In sum, the empirical evidence presented is com- 
patible with a theory implying that utility is com- 
pletely relative, whereas an absolute utility concept 
appears  to  be  incompatible  with  the  data.  Of 
course, the data also allow for specifications that 
make utility partly relative. 
To conclude this section, we  take the relativity 
model for granted and discuss the meaning of  the 
parameter estimates. First of  all, the estimates of 
p2 and p,  suggest that the total weight which an 
individual assigns to the incomes of  all other peo- 
ple is about half  the weight which he gives to his 
own income (in present  and past). This contrasts 
with  earlier  results  obtained  by  Kapteyn  et  al. 
(1980) who found P,  to be approximately twice as 
large as P2. Apart from data differences, tls  can 
be explained by noting that their analysis pertains 
to holiday  expenditures rather  than  income. The 
more conspicuous a good, the higher P,  probably 
is. Since holidays are-among the host cbrispicuous 
consumption  items,  the corresponding P,  should 
be substantially higher than for income, which is 
an aggregate of  all consumption possibilities, both 
conspicuous and unconspicuous ones. 
The parameter  Dl  measures  the  increase  in  a 
family's cost of  living due to an increase in family 
size. If  the size of  the family increases by 1%then 
the cost of  living of  the family increases by PI%. 
The low values  of  Pl  suggest  substantial econo- 
mies of  scale in the operation of  a family. In itself 
it  is  of  interest  to  see  how  a  purely  subjective 
model provides estimates of  seemingly "objective" 
quantities  like  cost  of  living  differences. It  has 
been  argued  elsewhere  (e.g.,  Kapteyn  and  Van 
Praag (1980)) that the methodological basis of  the 
present  measurement  method  is  identical  to  the 
one underlying conventional demand systems ap- 
proaches to the measurement of  differences in cost 
of  living. Although the  specification of  In f,  by
PO+ Plln fs,  is  very  primitive,  it  is  noteworthy 
that  never  before  in  cost  of  living  studies  was 
account taken of  both preference interdependence 
and habit formation. 
The estimate of  a (approximately 0.83) suggests 
a  fairly  strong  influence  of  past  income  distri- 
butions.  For  instance, weights  given  to  years  0, 
- 1, -2, etc. are 0.17, 0.14, 0.12, 0.10, 0.08, 0.07, 
0.06,  0.05,  0.04,  0.03,  etc.  So  the  present  year 
receives a weight whch is about six times as high You have printed the following article:
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